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Abstract. Cyber-Physical-Systems provide huge potential for delivering highly effective solutions for multiple safety critical 
domains such as health, automotive, sports etc. Given the complexity of cyber physical systems, it is important to ensure the 
safety and security of such systems. Failure of such systems could result in potential harm to people and temporary downtime 
of important infrastructures with detrimental consequences for industry and society. This article describes a safety and 
security framework that could be implemented when building cyber physical systems for the safety critical medical device 
domain. We also provide details of how this framework was implemented in an organisation, STATSports Group, which 
develops cyber physical systems for performance monitoring of elite athletes to the specification required.  
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1 Introduction 
Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPSs) “integrate physical devices, such as sensors and cameras, with cyber 
components to form an analytical system that responds intelligently to dynamic changes in the real-world 
scenarios” [1]. Some of usage areas of CPSs in healthcare are intelligent operating rooms, image-guided surgery 
and therapy, assisted living and fluid flow control for medicine. Given the safety critical health domain, it is 
important that CPSs are developed to adhere to the domains best practices standards and guidance 
documentation. 
CPSs in the health domain routinely collect, measure and transmit sensitive Personal Health Information (PHI). 
This data is required to be kept secure through regulations and legislation. The impact of breaches of PHI is 
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extensive in terms of risk to patient safety [2] and potential costs and losses in reputation for organisations [3]. 
This research describes a framework to address both of these aspects. 
2 A Safety and Security Framework for Medical Device Systems 
The framework aims to assist developers to achieve regulatory compliance in safety and security through 
implementing safety practices and data security controls throughout the development process. It can be used for 
CPSs in the medical device domain as it combines regulatory process development with product centric risk 
assessment. Safety and security requirements for CPSs within healthcare are critical as many monitor real-world 
physical processes. The unique use of diverse communications technologies and mobile computing by CPSs, 
make safety and security for these systems different from other information systems as data is exposed to many 
new attack surfaces [4]. The framework promotes safety and security throughout the development process. The 
framework consists of two main components: (1) MDevSPICE® addresses the safety aspects of the framework 
[5] and (2) the Secure Data-Flow component addresses the security aspects (see Figure 1). MDevSPICE® 
consists of processes, purpose statements, capability levels, process attributes, base practices and outcomes. The 
Secure Data Flow component includes Data Flow Security Controls (DFSCs) founded in  regulatory standards, 
which have been categorised for developer implementation through the ITU-T X.805 Security Architecture for 
Systems standard [6] and mapped to the risk centric threat model Process for Attack Simulation and Threat 
Analysis (PASTA) [7]. The secure data flow component also presents a corresponding testing suite designed for 
the DFSCs to access their effectiveness.   
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Fig. 1. Components of the Safety and Security Framework. 
2.1 MDevSPICE® Component of the Framework 
MDevSPICE® is a software process assessment framework that has been designed to enable medical device 
software developers to produce software that will be safe and easily integrated with other sub-systems of the 
overall medical device [5]. Relevant medical device software standards and software engineering best practices 
have been integrated within MDevSPICE®. Two of the prominent regulatory standards that have been integrated 
into MDevSPICE® are ‘IEC 62304:2006: Software life cycle processes for medical device development [8]’ and 
‘ISO 14971:2009: Application of risk management to medical devices’[9]. MDevSPICE® consists of 23 
processes grouped into system lifecycle, software lifecycle and support processes as can be seen in Figure 2.  
MDevSPICE® 
Processes
Base Practices
Process Attributes
Outcomes
Secure-Data Flow
PASTA Threat 
Modeling
Data Flow 
Security 
Controls
Vulnerabilities
Safety aspect is achieved
Security aspect is achieved
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Fig. 2. MDevSPICE® Processes 
Software development in safety critical domains such as healthcare is typically performed in a plan-driven 
manner. The V-Model lifecycle is well suited to medical device software development, given that it dedicates 
particular attention to both verification and risk management at every stage of life cycle. Software development 
approaches like agile and lean are preferred industry practice, as they enable iterative and incremental 
development, collaboration, communication, waste elimination, fast feedback, and balance of predictive upfront 
work, with adaptive just-in-time work and increasing quality. However, the necessity for intense controls and 
risk evaluation in safety critical domains require the implementation of agile and lean approaches be performed 
with some limitations and adaptations. In this context, there is an ongoing process in integration of agile and lean 
mind-set and practices into MDevSPICE® to make it more flexible and more solution oriented. Consequently, as 
part of this framework, we have integrated agile practices as part of the improvement recommendations which 
are provided as an output of performing an MDevSPICE® assessment. 
Medical Device System Life Cycle Processes
PRO.1 Project Planning
PRO.2 Project Assessment and Control
PRO.4 Risk Management
ENG.1 Stakeholder Requirements Definition
ENG.2 System Requirements Analysis
ENG.3 System Architectural Design
ENG.5 System Integration
ENG.6 System Qualification Testing
ENG.7 Software Installation
ENG.8 Software Acceptance Support
Medical Device Software Life Cycle Processes
ENG.4 Software Development Planning
DEV.1 Software Requirements Analysis
DEV.2 Software Architectural Design
DEV.3 Software Detailed Design
DEV.4 Software Unit Implementation and Verification
DEV.5 Software Integration and Integration Testing
DEV.6 Software System Testing
SRM.1 Software Risk Management
Support Processes
PRO.5 Configuration Management
SUP.4 Software Release
SUP.8 Software Problem Resolution
SUP.9 Software Change Request Management
ENG.10 Software Maintenance
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2.2 Secure-Data Flow Component of the Framework  
The secure data flow component adopts a risk-centric assessment to assist developers to meet regulatory 
requirements and secure data in flow [10] within a CPS.  CPSs operate in an environment of ever-changing 
threats and attacks. Security of data flow in this environment requires a risk assessment approach that considers 
how the evolving threats and attacks could expose the organizations assets to vulnerabilities, weakness of 
software, hardware, or online service that can be exploited. Threat modelling analysis and threat modelling 
methods deliver an important basis for the specification of security requirements of information systems and 
information protection. It provides a process for assessment for securing data flow within CPSs that incorporates 
security controls into the MDevSPICE® processes.  
The developed DFSCs were based on two medical device security standards IEC/TR 80001-2-2:2012  [11] and 
IEC/TR 80001-2-8:2016 [12]. IEC/TR 80001-2-2:2012 provides 19 high-level security-related capabilities 
(functions) and risks for consideration when connecting medical devices to IT-networks. These high-level 
capabilities provide only an understanding of the user needs, security risks that lead to the controls. Two of these 
capabilities, Transmission Confidentiality (TXCF) and Transmission Integrity (TXIG), concern data 
transmission. IEC/TR 80001-2-8:2016 identified security controls for each of the 19 security capabilities to 
consider during risk management activities. The DFSCs originated from the IEC/TR 80001-2-8 controls 
associated to the TXCF and TXIG capabilities. However, these controls did not cover all aspects of data 
transmission. Further mapping of the six standards utilized in IEC/TR 80001-2-8 development was completed to 
address the gap. The result was 63 DFSCs for consideration when completing a PASTA assessment for data flow 
security. The objective of the secure data flow process is to integrate the DFSCs into a PASTA assessment. The 
outcome of the secure data flow process provides a set of DFSCs for implementation into the MDevSPICE® 
software process to address data flow security. 
2.3 Implementation 
We have implemented the Framework in STATSports1, a company which develops CPSs, which include 
hardware sensors, firmware and software algorithms to provide performance monitoring technology to the sports 
industry. 
A.  Current Practices 
                                                        
1  www.statsports.com 
This is the Post-Print version of the published material 
6 
STATSports aims to provide technology that meets regulatory requirements for data security and exceeds what is 
required in the sports domain for product safety.  The company understands the requirements for compliancy 
with both the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [13] and The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [14] for securing personal and health data. This understanding is due to the fact that 
in the future STATSports plans on releasing monitoring technology for the healthcare industry and the imminent 
GDPR requirements for data security. The company recognizes there are significant changes required in 
development to ensure that data security and product safety are a key part of the process to meet GDPR and 
HIPAA compliancy. Therefore, STATSports is committed to ensuring they embarked upon implementing best 
practice processes for both safety and security to successfully transition the development of technology for the 
sports domain to the medical device domain. 
In order for STATSports to make this transition, the first step was to perform an MDevSPICE® assessment to 
observe the process gaps and challenges in relation to safety and security. This assessment provided insights on 
the safety and security practices prior to the implementation of the framework. Twenty-three processes were 
assessed and the following areas for improvement were identified below. 
1.There was no single point of contact for gathering new requirements/requirement changes in the organization. 
The organization’s Sport Scientists were directly contacting developers and demanding features to be developed. 
This resulted in developers’ receiving different tasks from multiple sources and it was difficult to understand 
which new features should be prioritized. 
2.A major challenge was that new requirements and features were constantly introduced throughout development. 
3.Safety and security requirements were not formally defined and managed, this could give rise to potentially 
significant changes (i.e. architectural changes) later in the development, particularly if software was released 
without inclusion of these critical requirements. 
4.Frequently, requirements lacked sufficient detail - this lead to instances of redevelopment as Sport Scientists 
were not always available to provide clarity in relation to requirements. 
5.Threats to security and associated vulnerabilities of the system were unknown. 
6.Which security controls to implement were unknown. 
7.Continuous Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation for both Safety and Security were not performed. 
8.There was no formal traceability from system requirements to the testing and release phases. 
9.Limited company experience implementing security in agile software development and how to implement the 
security guidelines that include security controls 
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B. Implemented Solutions 
The findings’ number in the above list in Section 2.3.A will be tagged against the corresponding improvement 
action below. STATSports has now introduced Scrum practices in relation to the software development process 
issues combined with lifecycle traceability that is required to demonstrate that safety processes are in place 
(addresses 1-4). A Senior Sports Scientist (SSS) now works closely with the development team in a Product 
Owner role. Every new request or requirement change coming from different Sport Scientists and other 
stakeholders are delivered to the SSS, and are then prioritized by this person (1). The SSS identifies the business 
value of the features/user stories while the developers assess the risks involved in implementation, with 
associated safety, security, technical and business risks now tracked throughout development specifically, both 
safety and security requirements are linked with risks which are assigned to development team members (2, 3, 
4). The product backlog and sprint backlog contain features/user stories that are maintained in a prioritized order 
in a tool, named Jira2 (1, 3, 4). Jira is used with another tool Confluence3 to provide traceability of 
requirements/features and user stories (1, 2, 8).  
In addition, a security focused analyst was recruited into the development team and contributes to the 
architectural design to ensure emphasis on data security (3, 5, 9). The security analyst starts the PASTA process 
in defining the appropriate level of security requirements to support the business goals in collaboration with the 
SSS (1, 3). The technical scope is then defined upon receipt of the prioritized requirements from the SSS and 
coordinated with the architecture design (1, 6, 9). This required STATSports to list all software/hardware, the 
various technologies, components and services that were associated with the application (4, 6). This followed 
with the decomposition of the application into components, via Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) and Use Case 
Diagrams, which were used to analyze the threats (5, 7). The vulnerabilities were identified for the use cases and 
the DFSCs required to address these vulnerabilities were presented (5, 7). The DFSCs were represented in the 
backlog in relation to each feature that is included for development in the sprint (1, 2, 6).  
A sprint duration of one week is adopted to manage constantly changing requirements (2, 3). Sprint Review and 
Retrospective meetings take place at the end of the week in addition to a Daily 15-min Stand-up meeting (1-9). 
User stories are defined with the associated acceptance criteria, which provide the essential information for the 
purposes of verification and validation (3, 4). The meetings ensure all members of the development team are 
kept up to date with progress. It also allows the team to raise issues with the process and identify risks (1-9).  
As the system consists of hardware and firmware in addition to software, the framework is also applied to 
hardware/firmware development and testing. This ensures full traceability for product development from 
                                                        
2  https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira 
3  https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence 
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inception, to prototyping and through to final release (8). All versions of firmware and hardware are captured 
using confluence and all bugs, hardware/firmware faults and resolutions are logged and viewed in Jira, offering a 
full historic record of product evolution (1, 2, 5, 8). 
We have observed that implementing the secure data flow component in a one-week sprint process was not 
possible due to understanding all data flow calls and identification of the controls and assessment of threats. In 
addition, testing requirements of the security controls need to be put in place within that sprint. These require 
development of a test suite against test cases which would include penetration testing. As a solution for this, we 
proposed running sprints in two-week intervals and running penetration testing on product release. 
3 Conclusion 
The Safety and Security Framework for Cyber Physical Systems is a new approach that was developed to 
promote safe and secure products in the safety critical healthcare domain.  
The implementation of the framework in STATSports has revealed issues and opportunities for improvement in 
terms of both safety and security. The interoperability of the two components was our main consideration. 
Action items were identified and prioritized. Secure Data-Flow processes including security risk assessment and 
threat modelling were performed at the initial phases of the project from a higher level of abstraction. During the 
later stages, security of data flow and security controls were continuously revisited and repeated however not 
meeting every sprint. The framework has assisted the company in moving towards compliance with HIPAA and 
the GDPR in relation to data security. It has stimulated the development of suitable policies and procedures for 
data security required by the GDPR and HIPAA for regulatory compliancy, not only in development but also 
organization wide. Implementation of the framework has also promoted the inclusion of security in the initial 
stages of the development of a new product. As a result of the implementation of the framework, STATSports 
has overcome difficulties they have had in relation to handling changes throughout development. In addition, 
through introducing Agile and security practices the company has significantly improved the traceability of 
requirements right throughout development. The company now understands the security vulnerabilities of their 
system and has put appropriate controls in place.   
Future work in the evolution of the framework will involve the execution of data security testing within 
MDevSPICE® using agile development. 
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